Job Market Paper
Agency Conflicts and Financial Covenants:
Theory and Estimates of Control Rights
November 2026. Paper, SSRN.
Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between financial covenant design, enforcement, and the impacts of violations, and how this relationship has evolved alongside the secular trends in violations and post-violation interventions. I develop an optimal contracting model in which covenants arise endogenously from a hidden effort problem and non-contractible interim action. By allocating contingent control rights, financial covenants mitigate the lack of cash-flow pledgeability and facilitate financing. I estimate the model using Simulated Method of Moments, targeting causally identified moments from the reduced-form covenant literature. The full-sample estimates reveal that violation rates are primarily governed by the hidden effort problem and performance signal structure, while intervention rates are largely driven by the costs and benefits of interim action. Subperiod estimates show that the weakening impact of covenant violations on managerial discipline is reflected in higher intervention rates, but not in the secular decline in violation rates. The rise of PE sponsorship explains around one quarter of the estimated structural shift.
FIRS-JFI 2026 Best Student Paper Award
2026 Hakan Orbay Research Award
2026 Hakan Orbay Research Award
Working Papers
The Loan Renegotiation Channel of Quantitative Easing
with Lin Xie (Minnesota Carlson). October 2026. Paper, SSRN.
Abstract
We study a channel of quantitative easing (QE) that operates through the renegotiation of existing bank loans. Matching syndicated-loan amendment histories to bank balance sheets, we find that larger purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are associated with more renegotiation at exposed banks, with the increase concentrated in amendments that favor lenders. Relative to other loans of the same firm in the same quarter, a doubling of quarterly purchases is associated with committed amounts 2.5 percent lower, spreads 10.6 basis points higher, and maturities 3.1 percent shorter on exposed banks’ amendments. The response is present among borrowers in covenant compliance and no stronger among those in violation, distinguishing it from renegotiation driven by creditor control rights in technical default. It is concentrated among well-capitalized, well-provisioned, and profitable banks and among less profitable, lower-valuation, but not highly leveraged borrowers, consistent with a bargaining channel in which financially strong lenders extract larger concessions from borrowers with weaker outside options. A shift-share design indicates that a ten-percentage-point increase in lender-favorable renegotiation lowers firms’ annual investment rate by 6 percent of its mean. QE thus tightened existing corporate credit for borrowers of exposed banks, potentially offsetting part of its expansionary effects on new lending.
Endogenously Imperfect Risk Sharing and Financial Amplification
October 2026. Paper.
Abstract
Why do financial contracts leave entrepreneurs exposed to aggregate risk even when contracts can be made fully state-contingent? I develop a financial accelerator model with a moral hazard problem in which private benefit of low effort is non-monetary and incentive compatibility holds state by state.
Since the marginal value of entrepreneurial net worth is countercyclical, the incentive constraint tightens procyclically. Entrepreneurs thus take advantage of this tradeoff by offloading more idiosyncratic risk at the cost of taking on more aggregate risk.
Imperfect aggregate risk sharing therefore emerges endogenously from the interaction between state-dependent incentives and risk sharing, rather than from contractual restrictions. This exposure amplifies aggregate shocks: entrepreneurial net worth becomes more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions, compressing borrowing capacity procyclically. Quantitatively, state-contingent contracting does not eliminate the financial accelerator, and the model generates substantial and persistent amplification of investment and output.
Work in Progress
Anatomy of Creditor Governance: Defensive and Offensive Control in Credit Markets